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Looking back as well as I can at my character during my school 
life, the only qualities which at this period promised well for the 
future, were, that I had strong and diversified tastes, much zeal 
for whatever interested me, and a keen pleasure in understanding 
any complex subject or thing. 
—Charles Darwin, Autobiography 
Each of our papers is bullish on invention, and each offers constructive 
ideas for how we might best focus our efforts to advance scholarship in 
the rhetoric of science and technology. Lawrence Prelli’s reflections on the 
growing importance of visual communication in the rhetoric of science 
share much in common with Celeste Condit’s paper, but her warning of 
the space between where we are now and where we need to be to safely 
move our enterprise forward captures a theme common to all of our 
papers. David Depew and John Lyne address similar concerns while also 
providing a compact summation of the intellectual terrain that lies before 
us. 
Lawrence Prelli, “The Prospect of Invention in 
Rhetorical Studies of Science, Technology, and 
Medicine” 
Lawrence Prelli’s summation of the state and direction of rhetoric of 
science scholarship advances the analysis of invention and innovation 
common to all our papers. Prelli’s paper sketches a field grounded in 
tradition, building on its prior achievements, expanding to new areas of 
study, and remaining civically engaged. Prelli sees no crisis facing our 
studies but only the need to further augment an enterprise that has 
already proven its capacity to critique scientific texts, illuminate their 
persuasive dynamics, and develop new insights by refining its multi-
faceted angles of vision. Prelli organizes his account of the rhetoric of 
science, technology, and medicine primarily, though not exclusively, 
according to invention, style, the Burkean arsenal, argumentation, and 
commonplaces. Although Prelli’s general canon-centered account initially 
sets to one side the issues currently challenging the rhetoric of science 
and technology that variously concern Condit and Ceccarelli, these issues 
break through almost on their own at various points in his paper. 
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Uniting Invention and Style 
Prelli’s opening paragraph on invention, in which he draws on the recent 
work of Joanna Hartelius and before her Floyd Anderson and Charles 
Kneupper, underscores that the intellectual home of rhetorical study is 
invention. For Prelli, as for Harris as well as Depew and Lyne, rhetoric is 
a knowledge-generating enterprise. A careful reader can clearly see that 
the formal analytic approaches in the rhetoric of science, technology, and 
medicine that Prelli sets forth is not a list. Rather, it is an argument and a 
scholarly agenda for reversing rhetoric’s reputation as a handmaiden, 
whether of philosophy or science, and for aggressively presenting it as a 
source of conceptual innovation and advance in science as well as in 
practical reason.  
In his second paragraph, Prelli mentions his own current work-in-
progress on competing visions of ecology in the early twentieth century 
and the different metaphors that grounded them. Particularly intriguing 
in his comments on the interplay of various of Burke’s master tropes 
operating in this discourse is their power to reveal “the imaginative 
origins” (this issue) of what later came to be regarded as technical 
perspectives—indeed as mere data. Prelli’s project of raising to life dead 
metaphors and to set before our eyes how they were not, after all, 
inevitable but imaginative possibilities in an initial scene of contestation 
promises to expand our understanding of the heavy epistemic work done 
by “style” in technical science and its inseparability from argument.  
Dramatism and Delivery 
Shifting to dramatism, Prelli briefly notes that the area is under-
developed. He cites work by Meisenbach and by Beck to demonstrate 
dramatism’s utility in illuminating the discourses of medicine. Turning to 
argument in general, irrespective of whether informed by metaphor or 
Burke’s master tropes or dramatism, Prelli (this issue) notes how recent 
work by Keränen and by Wynn shows how argument has “participated in 
the establishment and change of sciences historically.” Moving beyond 
the enumeration of studies by canonical or Burkean types, Prelli notes the 
emerging interest in the rhetoric of visual displays and cites the current 
innovative work of a number of rhetoric of science scholars. Though Prelli 
does not use the canonical term “delivery,” he highlights its increasing 
importance—particularly in an age of computer-generated visuals and 
graphics of science as performance.  
Institutional Pressures and Interdisciplinary Engagement 
In his account of “commonplaces,” Prelli shows himself as concerned with 
the cultural context in which scholarship in the rhetoric of science now 
finds itself. Where Condit sees a threat from unnamed outside corporate 
forces, Prelli comes close to naming them and sees them already in the 
upper administration using innocent-sounding technical sphere 
terminology to compromise or privatize public education—particularly 
liberal education. That Prelli makes no special point about the efficacy of 
rhetorical analysis as critical therapy for the disorders of the day suggests 
how securely for him the rhetoric of science is, of course and already, a 
civic art with a public responsibility for critique. Prelli and Condit then 
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share a vision for engaged scholarship in the rhetoric of science. This 
places their view in tension with the more cautionary temper of Depew 
and Lyne in their remarks in “Need We All Be Unified?” (this issue) and 
shows a common recognition that rhetoric of science study inevitably—
and consequentially for its future credibility—abuts politics.  
Prelli’s final segment on interdisciplinary engagement parallels the 
themes of Condit and Ceccarelli (this issue), but unlike them Prelli raises 
no issue of the respective need for a change of direction or a faster 
realization of an acknowledged goal. If I read him correctly, Prelli sees the 
rhetoric of science and technology as playing an increasing role in the 
places where the public and technical spheres intersect. This increased 
role takes on significance as the interdisciplinary associations made in 
pursuing our studies and the sheer force of their pertinence create 
opportunities of their own.  
I note a tension between Prelli’s formalist terminology—whether from 
the traditional rhetorical canon or from Burke—and the situation-rich 
approach that Depew and Lyne find so potent, and I believe this to 
tension to be a strength of scholarship in the rhetoric of science. Prelli, for 
example, early in his paper speaks of two approaches to invention—one 
based on style and the other on argument. A formalist armamentarium, 
whether classical or Burkean, and an analytic approach grounded in the 
situated particulars of argumentative contexts can and do go together. 
(Bringing them together, of course, requires practical judgment and 
rhetorical/critical art.) In his previous work and in his current paper, 
Prelli shows how argument and style work cooperatively. Why, then, 
speak of them as though they were two different types of study? 
My point is that we need to be mindful of our own tendency, following 
what I believe is an unfortunate legacy both of modernity and of the 
rhetorical tradition itself, to separate argument from style. If, in fact, they 
are functionally separate, as Prelli’s typology of studies would indicate, 
why do we as a field tolerate a separation that works against our 
strenuous efforts to abolish the modernist form/content dichotomy that 
has made it so difficult for the cognitive force of invention to be 
recognized? I am merely repeating here the point Mike Leff (1983) argued 
nearly thirty years ago in “Topical Invention and Metaphoric Interaction.” 
Leff began his essay with a citation from Burke’s Rhetoric of Motives: “the 
Aristotelian topics shift so imperceptibly between ideas and images that 
you wonder how the two realms could ever come to be at odds” (Leff, p. 
214). Two pages later, Leff used a metaphor to deliver one of the best, and 
most argumentatively cogent, lines of his essay: “topical method enables 
us to anticipate and appreciate a denouement; metaphor gives us a seat in 
the theater” (p. 216).1 As the work of Fahnestock and Prelli each has 
                                                        
1 That Leff’s essay makes use of an essay by the anthropologist Loren 
Eisely to show the fit between topical argument and style (pp. 224-227), 
makes his point all the more appropriate for students of the rhetoric of 
science. 
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shown, style and argument are integrated on the level of practice. To 
advance the case for invention that in this paper and in his earlier and on-
going work Prelli so well articulates, we need to place the tradition which 
separated these approaches on a path toward extinction. 
Celeste Condit, “Globalization and Purpose” 
Bridging Divides 
In her opening two sections, Celeste Condit (this issue) worries about the 
direction of studies in the rhetoric of science—and equally or more so, she 
is concerned about the state of the contemporary university and the forces 
that currently challenge it. David Depew and John Lyne (this issue) note 
the symmetry between her call for unity within and the threat from 
without, and they respond with nuanced agreement in a larger context of 
concern for distance from overt partisanship and a reminder of the 
salvific Darwinian virtues of variety. Various themes even in the first, and 
more somber, half of Condit’s paper—concern to blunt anti-science 
sentiment in rhetoric of science studies, the need to better appreciate 
science and better integrate our rhetorical criticism with the methods of 
social science and expand our horizons—in principle seem negotiable 
through the persuasiveness of exemplary studies and greater internal 
dialogue. As for choosing one or another explicit path around which to 
organize our studies—this is another matter. 
Traditionally in our most supple art, refusing stark choices in favor of 
negotiating contested boundaries has proven productive.2 The same has 
been true in our recent disciplinary history. By the early 1990s, what had 
seemed as clear alternatives for rhetorical criticism—the ideology-focused 
program of Michael Calvin McGee (see, e.g., McGee, 1984) and the close 
reading approach of Michael Leff (1992)—had developed into a 
constructive tension. Michael Pfau’s (2005) The Political Style of 
Conspiracy: Chase, Sumner and Lincoln provides a good example of how 
the inventional strategy of bridging distinct perspectives can produce 
conceptual benefits greater than would have been possible from either 
perspective taken as an exclusive focus. 
International Perspectives, Global Prospects 
In the second and more ecumenical part of her paper, “An Academic 
Route: Internationalization,” Condit’s concrete proposal for strengthening 
what has been an underdeveloped theme in our literature is easily 
compatible with the initiatives of the other papers. Condit proposes that 
ARST scholars move beyond the Anglo-European context of most studies 
in the rhetoric of science (in which she graciously and forthrightly 
includes her own) to examine the rhetorical and social dimensions of 
                                                        
2 Probably the most famous example is Cicero’s refusal in De Oratore to 
disavow Aristotle’s Rhetoric. However, in his own approach to the 
subject, Aristotle’s preoccupation with whether rhetoric was an “art” was 
largely irrelevant (Leff, 1986). 
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science in Africa, Asia and South America. Citing the work of Paroske 
(2009) on Mbeki and the AIDS crisis in South Africa and of Xiao (1995) 
on the reception of Darwinism in China, she notes that a promising if 
small number of studies in our field have already pioneered this theme. 
Her suggestions for a global expansion of rhetoric of science horizons, 
and a closer integration with social science, seem timely, welcome, and 
productive.  
Condit’s emphasis (this issue) on the need to “notice continuities and 
discontinuities among the humanities, natural sciences, and social 
science” seems essential to the success of any rhetoric of science project. 
Her suggestion that we adopt a perspective aimed at “improving the 
richness of life for human beings while protecting the natural world 
around us” (this issue) can certainly be an implicit guiding aim of our 
studies even if it is not the explicit given aim. The pan-world-perspective 
she favors would seem highly likely to occasion a changed understanding 
of how culture and nature reciprocally shape one another and to 
accelerate movement away from Eurocentric supercessionist models of 
science that are based on ever-receding memories of the Enlightenment.  
Stephen Toulmin (2001, pp. 61-62) gives an example, highly relevant 
to Condit’s project, of the scientific development of “miracle rice.” 
Toulmin explains how the Balinese government in the 1970s and 1980s, 
with the advice of technical experts in Milan, Italy and Seoul, South 
Korea, discouraged the traditional farming practices associated with 
“water temples.” The traditional Buddhist practice of using such 
“temples” to allocate water to local plots on a complex schedule developed 
over 800 years was abolished in favor a science-based, cost-effective 
procedure for making Bali self-sufficient in producing an important 
staple. But when within two years the fields were infested with pests and 
farmers had to buy ever newer and pest-resistant strains, the farmers 
pressured the government to return to the old irrigation system. The 
foreign experts recommended pesticide and regarded the protest as 
religious obscurantism.  
In the end, the water temple system was restored, but on the basis of a 
compromise between the old system and the water needs of the newer 
strains of rice. In a way invisible to Western engineering, agriculture, and 
economics, the waterways and practices associated with the temples were 
part of “the material infrastructure of Balinese culture” and had 
“succeeded in minimizing the exposure of native crops to insects, disease, 
drought, flood and other natural enemies” (Toulmin, 2001, p. 62). The 
moral of the story, as Toulmin notes, is not to decry science but, in 
keeping with what I take to be Condit’s point, to enable us, using multi-
disciplinary perspectives, to attend to local culture, its language, rituals 
and context-rich ways of knowing. Meera Nanda (2003) tells parallel 
stories of science and the modernizing process in India, while Susan 
Jasanoff (2004) and her coauthors bring similar stories from Europe, 
America, Africa and the Caribbean. Anne Fadiman (1997) likewise brings 
the theme of the science/religion/medicine/multi-culture interface close 
to home in her account of the interchange between Hmong and Western 
medicine in California. 
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Condit’s testimony to the inspiration she has received from 
encounters with scholars from other parts of the world is itself a powerful 
reason in favor of her proposal. Despite differences over how unified we 
need to be or how closely any particular research proposal should be 
linked to an overt political agenda, her suggestion of a pan-world 
perspective melds well with the interdisciplinary and horizon-expanding 
thrust of all our papers. Seen in this light, Condit’s proposal seems an 
excellent and still largely novel avenue for advancing Depew and Lyne’s 
recommendation that we encourage colleagues in science studies to make 
greater use of the resources of the rhetorical tradition while taking full 
advantage ourselves of the opening of the social-discursive turn in science 
studies.  
David Depew and John Lyne, “The Productivity of 
Scientific Rhetoric” 
Many of the topics addressed in “The Productivity of Scientific Rhetoric,” 
(Depew & Lyne, this issue) are presaged by Prelli and by the emphasis he 
gives to the analytic cash-value of the rhetorical tradition, especially 
invention, and of Burke’s pentadic and master tropic riffs upon it. The 
concerns of Condit that our scholarship have an impact are also 
addressed by their paper. What is distinctive in Depew and Lyne is their 
compact summation of the unique situation, challenges, and horizon of 
opportunity in which the rhetoric of science and technology now finds 
itself.  
In the assessment of Depew and Lyne, we are happily located between 
more established disciplines—and find ourselves at a most opportune 
moment. Given the turn away from the emphasis on logic and 
mathematics in the history and philosophy of science and toward 
discourse and culture in these same studies, our historical focus on 
audience and rhetorical choice could not be more timely or more 
potentially consequential. No less than their lay counterparts, scientific 
audiences respond to rhetorical choices “embedded” in scientific 
discourse. Far from being decorative or of the surface, style and all the 
elements of the rhetorical armamentarium are epistemic and productive 
of scientific knowledge. In the view of Depew and Lyne, if we have but the 
wit and restraint to make the most of the combination of our traditional 
resources, novel position, and historic moment, we may be on the cusp of 
a significant disciplinary advance centered in invention.  
The Place of Rhetoric in the Discursive Turn 
Particularly important for their first section (and, in fact, for the 
structuring of their entire paper) are Depew and Lyne’s inter-related 
questions “whether the social-discursive turn in the study of science has 
taken full advantage of rhetorical theory and criticism” and “whether we 
rhetoricians of science have taken full advantage of the opening created 
by the broader discursive-social turn to articulate, deploy, and advertise 
our distinctive yet varied approach” (this issue). 
In answer to the first question, Depew and Lyne find a close ally in 
Bruno Latour and see his billing of rhetoric in his studies of science as 
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explicit and exemplary. But Depew and Lyne find Latour compromised by 
his inventional exuberance in enfranchising non-humans in a great 
parliament of deliberation. Depew and Lyne display a greater sense than 
Latour of the rhetoric of science as a performing art and in their 
assessment that Latour’s problem is not knowing when to stop. Latour’s 
parliament of beings hyperbole has cast doubt upon his otherwise 
exemplary emphasis on context thereby blunting his message that there is 
an alternative to a radical social constructivism. A rhetoric of science 
performance that would build upon Latour’s strengths yet avoid his 
weaknesses would begin with a rich, yet disciplined, view of context and 
of the multi-faced character of argument. 
Depew and Lyne have no doubt that ARST rhetoricians have the 
wherewithal to produce an account of context even richer than Latour’s. 
They list 16 different approaches to ARST studies in their opening section 
and—pointing with pride to what Condit views with alarm—suggest that a 
diversity of perspectives (rather than programmatic unity) will enable us 
to carry further forward what the best of our fellow travelers in other 
fields are capable of advancing only up to a point. “Rhetoric is 
opportunistic and unruly, and we cast our nets where we think the fishing 
is good,” they write (this issue). To extend their theme of the disciplined 
use of a diverse but common repertoire, the rhetorician of science is not 
limited to being a purse-seiner but should aspire to be “the complete 
angler” whose tackle box is well stocked with lures for a broad variety of 
waters, species, locales, topographic-hydrographic confluences and 
occasions (this issue).  
Depew and Lyne’s assessment of the high promise of the rhetorician 
of science’s combination of opportunism, diverse foci and disciplined 
knowledge of where and how to fish and when to cut bait, coupled with 
their sympathetic critique of Latour “leads us to the contentious claim 
that rhetoric of science contextualizes science better than does sociology 
of science, because the former tends to reduce arguments to context 
rather than defining context by argument” (this issue). 
Demarcation as Focal Point for Rhetoric of Science 
Combining Burke’s pentad as a way of tracking agency with “Tom 
Goodnight’s threefold distinction between personal, technical, and public 
spheres of discourse,” Depew and Lyne (this issue) prepare the way for 
the detailed support of their thesis in the middle sections of their paper. 
One final point of framing places in relief that grounds of their confidence 
that the diversity of foci in the rhetoric of science is compatible with a 
rough unity in its overall explanatory ambitions:  
If there is one theorem that we rhetoricians of science have 
sustained . . . it is that demarcation or boundary-work between 
science and society, between science, non-science, junk science 
and pseudo-science, and between various scientific fields 
themselves is irreducibly rhetorical (this issue). 
The demarcationist gospel, though a gift that promises to keep on giving 
for rhetoricians of science, is, as with its paradigmatic original, bad news 
before it is good news, sad news before it is glad news (Buechner, 1977). 
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Even when thoroughly understood, the “essentially contested” character 
of demarcation is a source of on-going anxiety between and within 
Goodnight’s public and technical spheres. Depew and Lyne put the 
paradox of this good news/bad news, blessing/curse for rhetorical studies 
frankly:  
the main implication of recognizing that demarcation is 
essentially rhetorical is both inescapable and difficult to hear even 
for some of its supporters” (this issue).  
When the Public Sphere Meets the Technical One 
The difficulty, of course, is that a truly rhetorical perspective on science 
reveals that the well-advertised capacity of science to correct itself is 
largely mythic, that it at the very least has glaring exceptions, and, that at 
very best, is vastly oversold. Not only do disciplines leak at the seams, 
demarcation disputes are handled through cross-sphere influences—some 
of which are subtle and some of which are not. And indeed for democracy, 
many of them are downright embarrassing. To support their thesis that 
the public sphere has the ability to correct the technical sphere, Depew 
and Lyne offer the example of the successful opposition of the Catholic 
Church in the 1920s and 1930s to eugenics. In their view, the vigorous 
public sphere opposition of the church “inspired criticism in technical 
ones that eventually destroyed the genetics arguments on which eugenics 
was predicated” (this issue). 
Three things need to be said about this representative anecdote 
(perhaps “representative antidote” would be a happier term).  
First, the same example also legitimates public sphere religious 
opposition to stem cell research, popular skepticism of climate change 
science, belief that immunization shots in school lead to autism, popular 
interest in intelligent design, European skepticism about genetically 
modified organisms, skepticism about AIDS research, and a veritable 
Pandora’s box of other examples of public sphere distrust of technical 
science.  
Second, in the conceptual economy of the paper, especially in the 
“Embedded Rhetoricity and “Inventing on All Cylinders” sections, 
confidence in the essential soundness of public sphere argumentation is 
necessary to blunt the “pessimistic induction” of post-moderns once they 
realize, particularly in the case of biology, how thoroughly rhetorical is the 
process by which this and similar historical sciences acquire knowledge. 
One has to have a very robust faith indeed in the essential soundness of 
public deliberation for Depew and Lyne’s instructive and deeply 
embedded rhetorical examples to work—that is, for these examples not to 
be read as a form of deconstructing scientific authority but as 
reconstructing it on a deliberative/argumentational basis. It is difficult to 
see how the eugenics example—even when boosted by their example of 
Martin Luther King’s call for justice—can do other than reinforce the 
“pessimistic induction” it is meant to allay.  
Third, to defend philosophically-robust public sphere contestation of 
topics on which the technical sphere has spoken—that is, to do more than 
acknowledge a first amendment right to freedom of expression—is 
John Campbell  Poroi 9,1 (April 2013) 9 
something that technical sphere representatives will almost certainly hear 
as the anti-science sentiments of yet another group of social 
constructivists and not as the voice of pro-science scholars who are also 
pro-democracy. Clearly, such a charge against Depew and Lyne would be 
mistaken, but it is a misunderstanding to which their position, and that of 
our general endeavor, is open. 
In sum, Depew and Lyne’s essay, which expertly and inspirationally 
captures our moment and prospects, seems to rest upon a paradox: a 
paper that consistently warns against associating the rhetoric of science 
with political stances itself rests on a political analogy. Their analogy 
between confidence in a presumably good-policy-producing public sphere 
and the capacity of a technical sphere shaped by rhetorical invention and 
context-centered persuasive argument to produce good science seems 
dangerously close to what Steve Fuller, as opposed to Chris Mooney, has 
called “Republican science”—of which Depew and Lyne seem wary. In 
Fuller’s (2000) words, “Republicanism represents the Ideal State in that 
it allows people to speak their minds with impunity” (p. 11). 
A Modern Constitution 
As I read their paper, Depew and Lyne also seem to favor a science in 
which cross-sphere discussion and persuasion with and by “untutored 
publics” (this issue) sets the norms governing, or at least mediating, the 
personal, public and technical spheres. It would seem that Depew and 
Lyne’s assessment of our historical situation is correct, and they have 
done us the service of confronting us with its consequences. The 
autonomy of science on the positivist technical sphere model (arguably 
the model of Science—The Endless Frontier) and James Madison’s 
parallel argument in the Federalist Papers for the Constitutional 
separation of powers have enjoyed similar fates.3 The fate of positivism is 
now commonplace. As Richard Neustadt (1980) says of the Constitution’s 
separating of powers, “It did nothing of the sort. Rather it created a 
government of separated institutions sharing powers” (p. 29). 
 Change “spheres” to “powers” and Depew and Lyne have described 
the constitution of public and technical policy formation in the post-
positivist, post-modern world. It is difficult to exaggerate how much the 
ambitious and potentially productive research program they propose rests 
upon, to borrow Condit’s image, minding the very considerable gap 
between current evidence and a convincing demonstration of public 
sphere rationality in addressing the excesses of the technical sphere—or 
in providing confidence in scientific argumentation once the rhetorical 
basis of that argumentation is made clear.4  
                                                        
3 Madison wrote: “This policy of supplying by opposite and rival interests, 
the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of 
human affairs, private as well as public” (1982, pp. 261-5). 
4 On the other hand, overcoming this difficulty would have very significant 
implications not only for our understanding of science but of rhetoric 
itself. Stanley Fish’s (1989) celebrated account of rhetoric properly 
stresses the contrast between depth and surface, substance vs. 
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In answering the above closely related points, Depew and Lyne are not 
without resource. Goodnight, as they note, develops Habermas who 
sought to imagine how the public/technical sphere boundary might be 
mediated. The complex pathways and reciprocal relations among the 
private, public and technical spheres suggests, as Depew and Lyne allude, 
various potentially enriching complications. But unlike Habermas who 
strives to filter out “distorted communication” through ideal speech 
situations, Depew and Lyne sound very much as if they were of the 
opposite persuasion. They seem as though they were inclined to celebrate 
the messiness, complexities, and attendant risks to epistemic sanitation 
that are entailed in the discursive ecologies of a rough and tumble 
rhetorical republic. Their example of the victory of the Catholic Church 
over eugenics, though morally justified, was an exercise in political power 
that seems to sanction a populist political model of how the public 
sphere/technical sphere might be policed. On the other hand, their view 
that this example shows how issues in the popular public sphere can 
“[inspire] criticism in technical ones” (this issue) could imply an elitist 
model of filtration—though I do not believe this interpretation captures 
the full complexity of their view.  
By contrast, Philip Kitcher (2001, 2011), arguably the leading 
philosopher on the relation between science and democracy, shares 
Habermas’ concern for strenuous regimes of public sphere/technical 
sphere mediation. In each of his two books on science and democracy, 
Kitcher seems to favor specially constructed forums for lay/expert 
deliberation that, for the most part, our common political culture has yet 
to evolve.5 For Kitcher, Depew and Lyne’s eugenics example, and quite 
possibly my own previous views on the educational merits of debate on 
Darwin and Intelligent Design, would probably be candidates for 
illustrating “vulgar democracy” of which, needless to say, Kitcher does not 
approve.6 Kitcher’s aim, like that of Depew and Lyne, myself, and many 
members of ARST, is a rapprochement between the democratic ideal of 
deliberation in the interest of the common good (including the interests of 
the poor and marginalized) and the claims of truth. That Kitcher has 
written two books on virtually the same subject that do not claim to have 
the answer to the question of the appropriate mediation underscores how 
challenging and timely are the issues that Depew and Lyne raise. It also 
shows how opportune, as they rightly stress, is the moment for inter-
disciplinary studies exploring the interrelation between the discourses of 
the personal, technical, and public spheres.   
                                                                                                                                         
insubstantiality. The success of the projects of Randy Harris and of 
Depew and Lyne would require a significant refiguring of this historic 
divide.  
 
5 On Habermas (2001), see note #2 p. 172, Chapter 8, “Constraints on 
Free Inquiry,” which concerns the history of life, biomedical technology, 
genetically modified organisms and climate change. 
6 See Kitcher (2011, especially pp. 113, 126, 128, 140, 177, 220, 221). 
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Where To From Here? 
We have in all our essays a stimulating set of proposals, a daunting set of 
problems, and some varied and potentially fruitful inventional resources. 
Perhaps Neustadt’s description of the institutional reality of the 
Constitution (despite the common mistaken interpretation of it—
sanctified by the Federalist Papers no less) might possibly provide a 
useful analogy for rhetoricians of science to develop in buffering the shock 
that recognition of the inability of science to autonomously manage its 
own affairs and the necessary for its inter-action with popular opinion 
inevitably creates. At very least, the ambiguities in Depew and Lyne’s 
eugenics example, coupled with its importance not only for their case but 
also for analogous issues of gaps or intersections raised by Condit and 
Prelli, underscore the need for ARST scholars to focus on democratic 
demarcations. 
If the faith in public sphere rationality common to the civic tradition 
of rhetoric is to prove justified in the era in which the rhetorical character 
of science becomes increasingly evident, ARST scholars should be well 
positioned to understand the issues involved; to help create the needed 
relations of mutual trust; and to nurture personal, public and technical 
sphere contexts in which reasoned deliberation about science and its 
implications can occur. We have work to do. With some inventional skill 
and some active inter-disciplinary diplomacy, I am confident that our 
society’s twenty-year experiment in the rhetoric of science—which seeks 
in its own context to reaffirm and reanimate the aspirations of those 
august figures who thought a democratic republic would support science 
and the arts (U.S. Constitution)—will continue to specialize, diversify, and 
flourish. 
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